Developing the Information
Industry in Taiwan: Entrepreneurial State, Guerrilla Capitalists, and Accommodative Technologists 1 Vincent Wei-cheng Wang T HE RAPID GROWfH of the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs)-South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore-during the 1960s and 1970s drew considerable academic interest and lively policy debates. By adopting export-led industrialization (EU) development strategies, these NICs greatly benefitted from the remarkable expansion of world trade during the heyday of the Bretton Woods system, and rose to become major exporters of labor-intensive manufactured products (e.g., textiles and electronics).
However, starting from the early 1980s, these NICs gradually (and perhaps irreversibly) lost their traditional competitive advantage in laborintensive products, and thus had to discover new sources of growth.
2 Key economic decision-makers reached the conclusion that to regain competitiveness in the world economy, the export-oriented economic structures of these NICs must be upgraded-that is, to become more technology-and skill-intensive. These NICs thus began to develop the so-called high-tech industries. In particular, information technology (IT) has been entrusted to play a central role in this new strategy. rent technology-intensive strategy is a natural extension of Taiwan's previous development strategies. The second point is that the role of the Taiwanese state in promoting high-technology industries has been very important. The state has played a positive entrepreneurial part in the inception of pivotal technologies and in the export vigor of Taiwan's information industry on the world scene. However, the large state role has not seemingly led to negative consequences commonly found in other countries. The third point is that Taiwan's small-and medium-sized informatics firms, or what I call "guerrilla capitalists," were arguably suited for some games (e.g., PCs and software) in this information technology race, due to their flexibility, agility, and assiduity. However, their small size becomes a serious disadvantage in othergames (e.g., semiconductors); this is where the entrepreneurial state has stepped in. The fourth point is that acquisition of high-technology in Taiwan has followed an accommodative model, by maintaining close ties with the global technological market and by harnessing MNCs' investment with the country's macroeconomic development, rather than by asserting narrow economic nationalism and restricting the domestic market.
In sum, the contours of Taiwan's high-technology development have been shaped by a dynamic trio of entrepreneurial state, guerrilla capitalists, and accommodative technologists.
The first section discusses the linkages between Taiwan's IT development and its previous development strategies. The second section reviews the key policies of Taiwan's IT strategy. The third section examines the major institutions responsible for promoting IT in Taiwan. This paper concludes with a summary of the political economy of Taiwanese success in high-tech industries in light of relevant theories.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: THE l.ATESI DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY Unlike other LDCs with rich natural resources and large domestic markets, Taiwan has no significant resources, except perhaps its human resources and high savings rates. These endowment-based characteristics have defined Taiwan's development strategies. Most scholars agree that a pool of educated, well-trained, disciplined, and inexpensive unskilled and semiskilled labor was the bedrock of Taiwan's successful labor-intensive EU in the 1960s-70s. However, it is even more important to recognize that, for developing high-technology industries, Taiwan's exceptional combination of skilled labor (i.e., well-educated and, comparably speaking, inexpensive engineers and scientists) and savings-both human and financial capital-constitute a major advantage. Such reasoning was so evident among the decision makers that it could be judged as a policy "consensus" on development.
Summing up Taiwan's postwar economic development, Dr. Otto Lin, former president of Taiwan's Industrial Technology Research Institute, provided this review:
Taiwan's development strategy in the 1950s was to focus on labor-intensive import-substituting industries in order to lay a stable foundation for economic growth; in the 60s it was to orient domestic industries toward export promotion in order to create jobs; in the 70s it was to launch heavy and capital-intensive industries in order to facilitate industries' upward vertical integration; and in the 80s it was to promote "strategic industries" and national key technologies in order to lead industries' upgrading and improve industries' structures. 5 It is thus important to understand Taiwan's current high-technology development as a logical extension from its previous development sequences, rather than a detached new undertaking. And without the foundations laid by those successive strategies, IT could not have become a new viable source of growth and wealth for Taiwan. The following example of the relationship between IT and electronics will illustrate these points.
There existed close ties between IT and the electronics industry. In its formative years, IT had often been considered a part of the broad electronics industry, and grew out of the successful consumer electronics industry. Direct links existed between color TVs and color monitors, between integrated circuits (ICs) widely used in many consumer electronic products and computers, semiconductors and other components. Moreover, the technical expertise accumulated in the electronics industry was easily transferrable to the information industry. The information industry was not created in a total vacuum, as a result of a ''visionary" technocrat's grandiose proposal. Rather, it was built on and expanded the previous successes of the electronics industry in terms of success in the market place and experience from learning. In addition, multinational corporations (MNCs) played a crucial formative role in Taiwan's electronics industry in the 1960s. More recently, however, they were also included in Taiwan's information drive, instead of being excluded. And broadly speaking, to maintain competitiveness in exports, which is the lifeline for an island economy like Taiwan, Taiwan must upgrade its products by moving gradually away from low-cost, labor-intensive commodities to high-value added, technology-intensive ones, and by concurrently increasing value-added mature products.
Two additional arguments further underscore the ties between IT and the established sectors. First, IT in Taiwan from the start has been des-
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ignated as a "strategic industry" -that is, a crucial industry that can provide both backward linkages to the established sectors (e.g., textiles and consumer electronics) by improving their productivity and prolonging their life cycles, and furward linkages to the nascent as well as established sectors by enhancing their technological development and creating new sources of competitiveness.
Second, IT is entrusted with the task of correcting some of the negative externalities resulting from the previous growth-centered cum exportpush strategy. These new emphases include ( 1) improving the quality of life, instead of pursuing single-minded growth; (2) seeking more balanced growth, which includes enriching the domestic market, instead of overweighing or over-depending on the foreign markets; (3) informationalizing the society, which will contribute to the empowerment of the citizenry-an essential element to democratic politics; and ( 4) salvaging the environment and overcoming infrastructural and transportation bottlenecks-both being sacrificial lambs for a long period of extraordinary rapid growth. These new tasks assigned to IT are precisely the types of adjustments that need to be made in Taiwan's metamorphosis into a mature industrial democracy. It is not an exaggeration to characterize IT as the bridge for Taiwan -connecting a Third-World stardom status to a First-World prestige.
Key decision-makers, industrialists, and intellectuals concerned with Taiwan's economic development long understood, and agreed on, the importance of informatics to their country's future. For instance, back in 1979, K T. Li, a principal architect of Taiwan's economic development, stated, " [T] he development of the information industry is a worldwide trend, and Taiwan's economic future depends very much on our ability to catch up this trend. "6 A virtual consensus on the need for continuous economic development existed in Taiwan among a network of experts like Li, forming an epistemic community.' This community, throughout successive phases of Taiwan's post-war development, has often enjoyed strong political sup-port (and autonomy) from the state, and has thus "embedded" many of its ideas in several key institutions, which perpetuates its political influence. The next two sections examine the most important policies and institutions responsible for promoting IT in Taiwan. KEY POUCIES OF TAIWAN'S IT DEVELOPMENT 1980 marked the inauguration of Taiwan's concerted IT strategy, as a ten-year IT development plan (see below) was approved. The late president Chiang Ching-kuo's personal plea served as a catalyst. He said:
In recent years, by employing computers in improving management and technology, the U.S., Japan, and other [advanced industrialized] countries have gained rapid progress in production technology and significant increase in productivity. In order for our nation's technology to catch up [with that of the advanced industrialized countries], we must popularize computer education and application. The government, the educational community, and the industry must make an all-out collective effort to develop the computer and information industry, in order to upgrade our industries, and enhance the competitiveness of our nation's products in the world markets. 8 Chiang's advocacy symbolizes a correct and timely perception of the advent of the information society. The microelectronics revolution and the arrival of the microcomputers lowered the entry barrier for select LDCs (mostly NICs) and offered them a rare opportunity to join the global technological race and to transform their economies and societies. In November 1984, Premier Yii Kuo-hwa pointed out the missions of Taiwan's "information industry strategy":
(1) to promote effective utilization of computers in order to improve productivity and efficiency and add to living standards, (2) to open up the domestic market in order to spur the development of the information industry, and (3) to upgrade technology in the information industry and then to expand the domestic market into world export markets. 10 These ideas about the importance of the information technology and the role played by the new information industry in Taiwan's economic transformation were codified in several important plans and embedded in several newly created institutions. The most important such plans were two ten-year plans for the information industry in Taiwan.
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The Ten-Year Plan, 1980 -1989 Taiwan's first national plan for the information industry 12 had two central goals: (1) developing a new industry, and (2) promoting this industry for exports. To create a new industry, the plan called for promotion of computers around the island so as to foster a favorable environment for the development of the local information industry. To promote computers as an export industry, the plan emphasized accumulation and upgrading capabilities in information technology.
The 1 OYI\ called for the employment of four specific policies to achieve those twin goals: (1) nurturing the domestic market, by encouraging public and private enterprises to use computers; (2) manpower training, by fostering and training manpower for the information and computer industries, especially highly skilled experts; (3) introducing high technology, by improving the R&D environment, and establishing a comprehensive R&D system; and ( 4) improving the investment environment for the growth of the local information industry.
In essence, the information and computer industries were designated as "strategic industries," eligible for special government assistance. Some concrete measures of government assistance have included: ( 1) asking designated development funds and financial institutions to grant preferential loan services to computer-related strategic products, (2) empowering the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park to give preferences to applications for computer-related development and manufacturing activities, (3) including computer-related strategic products in the Statute for Encouragement of Investment as eligible for those special incentives ear-marked for "essential manufacturing activities," and (4) favorable government procurement oflocally made computer-related strategic products.
The first ten years were the formative stage for Taiwan's information industry. In general, the implementation of this plan was successful, and the information industry began to take off. Through government promotion and the private sector's adjustment to the new incentive structure, this industry witnessed rapid growth, having become a major force in the nation's economy and export, and, meantime, contributed to heightened public awareness.
One way to evaluate the effectiveness of 10YP 1 is to present a quantitative profile of Taiwan's information industry. Table 1 shows the evolution of Taiwan's information industry over time. Table 2 shows the extent of dominance by certain Taiwanese information products in the world markets. As we can see from these statistics, during 10YP 1 Taiwan's information industry had transformed from an insignificant appendage to the electronics industry to an industry very important to Taiwan's economic vitality and export vigor.
But it also encountered some bottlenecks. Although in 1988 Taiwan became a major world producer of information products (with sales of over US$ 5 billion), it was hindered by its dependence on imported key components, its weak name-brand recognition and marketing channels, and its technological bottleneck above the microcomputer level. Furthermore, there was still an acute shortage of information industry manpower, although the R&D expenditure generally met the target.
Clearly, Taiwan's IT development needed a boost and reorientation. As a director at Taiwan's Institute for Information Industry (III) summed up, ''The emphasis for the first ten years was on the production of information goods. The emphasis for the next ten years shall be on the application [of IT in various aspects oflife]." 13 A planning official in Taiwan's Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) also concurred, "[The information industry] in the first ten years focused on hardware production and exportation. In 1 OYP 2 , we shall actively promote software and the national market in order to create an information society. " 14 This is the background for the second ten-year plan.
(Jl (Jl ~ 1978-1991 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total output* 32 Growth rate ( This plan was drafted in 1990 based on the accomplishments and shortcomings of the IOYI\ and an evaluation of the development trends of the world's·information technology. It symbolizes Taiwan's aspiration to become an "information Goliath. " 15 It seeks to accomplish four goals. The first is to popularize the utilization of information technology so as to increase productivity of the overall industrial structure and improve people's quality of life. As I argued earlier, this is the most important new raison detre of IT, one different from that of the old mainstay of low-cost, low-Wage, growth-centered projects. The -second goal is to make Taiwan a major supplier of information products by developing crucial components and technology, upgrading product quality, and controlling marketing channels. The third goal is to achieve technological autonomy by expanding the scope and level of R&D investment through participation by both the government and the business. The second and third goals together present a difficult yet crucial task for Taiwan: to transform itself from a reliable OEM (original equipment manufacturer) contented with cut-throat profits earned from simple assembly to a technological leader reaping techn<r logical rents. And in a very crude sense, this is what distinguishes the First
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World from the Third World. The fourth goal is to train a large pool of information manpower as a solid foundation of an information society by raising both the quality and quantity of manpower. This perhaps holds the key to the accomplishment of the previous two objectives. To sum up, 10YP 2 identifies the following areas as priorities: computer application, IT output, R&D, and manpower training. Severa) goals are noteworthy. The plan projects that Taiwan's share in the global IT market will rise from 1.9 percent in 1988 to 3.1 percent in 2000. As it turned out, however, this goal had already been met in 1991 (see table 1 ). In addition, the plan seeks to steadily raise the total R&D expenditures in industry revenues: from 3 percent in 1988 to 5 percent in 1995, and to 6.5 percent in 2000. By then, the private sector's investment in R&D will top that of the government by a four-to-one margin.
The most distinctive features of 10YP 2 can be summarized as follows. First, although the plan still views the information industry as an important export leader, it further charges this industry with the task of dissemination of information and improvement of life quality of citizens. This is a marked departure from the previous "growth first, all for export" economic ideology. Second, the plan recognizes the maturation of hardware assembly, and instead stresses the development of indigenous R&D on key components and technologies. Third, more importantly, the plan views software as the future leading force for Taiwan's information industry, and designates special incentives to software (e.g., a software industrial park). Given Taiwan's comparative advantage in skilled labor (i.e., well-trained yet inexpensive scientists and engineers), this is a market niche Taiwan should focus on. In fact, it may not be an overstatement to say that strength in software (knowledge and technology defined as the ability to solve complex problems) is a new source of the wealth of nations. 16 As explained earlier, the power of economic ideas rests in institutions. The next section examines these institutions. 16 Robert U. Ayres, 'Technology: The Wealth of Nations, " Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 33 (1988) Development, vol. 5, no. 2 (1990) , pp. 101-8; "Software Industry Development in the Third World: Policy Guidelines, Institutional Options, and Consttaints," World Development, vol. 15, no. 10-11 (1987 Development, vol. 15, no. 10-11 ( ), pp. 1249 . 
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Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park (HSIP)
Often lauded as 'Taiwan's Silicon Valley," HSIP, located 55 miles (90 km) south of Taipei in the booming technopolis ofHsinchu, was created in 1980 to spearhead Taiwan's high-technology development. By providing special incentives to advanced personnel and companies engaged in high-technology activities, HSIP encourages industrial technology research and innovation. It is appropriate to characterize HSIP as a "second-generation export processing zone" (EPZ), which defined Taiwan's successful EU in the 1960s and early 70s. There are in fact some similarities between EPZ and HSIP, such as an assortment of incentives, export orientation, and labor-intensiveness. But the similarities are only superficial. In a nutshell, HSIP is an upgraded form of EPZ, with higher R&D emphasis, higher-caliber employees, and higher productivity.
18
17 HSIP was created under the NSC, symbolizing the R&D orientation of the park. In contrast, HSIP's predecessor, the much-touted export processing zones (EPZ) which defmed Taiwan's success during EU 1 , were founded by the MOEA. 18 A recent survey found that on average firms in HSIP spent 6 percent of revenues on R&D, whereas for the general manufacturing sector only 1 percent; nearly half ( 48 percent) of the HSIP's workers have college education or above, but for local manufacturers it is only 8 percent.
Compiled from F'fW! China journal, 15 July 1994, p. 8. (1) Assisting the government in mapping out short-, mid-, and long-term development plans for the information industry (2) Assisting government agencies and state-run enterprises with the task of computerization (3) Training the manpower of the information industry ( 4) Studying and introducing advanced software technologies in order to upgrade local software design capabilities (5) Fostering the development oflocal computer-related industries (6) Promoting computer usage, and upgrading the level of computer application (7) Providing market and technology intelligence (8) Assisting in improving the environment for investment in the local information industry
Perhaps the greatest contribution of HSIP so far has been its role in technology transfer. This is seen in its increasing attractiveness to the returning expatriates. HSIP has to some extent reversed the brain drain.
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Many firms in HSIP were founded by Chinese-American scientists and engineers, many in well-knit teams, who had obtained advanced degrees, and worked in positions of prominence in the U.S. 20 However, the diffusion model is not the only modus operandi in HSIP. Several prominent and equally important industrialists rose from a completely different track, which I call an "indigenous path." The most prominent example is Stan Shih-"Taiwan's Bill Gates"-the shoestring entrepreneur who founded the Acer Corporation. Originating as an OEM for IBM, NEC, AT&T, etc., Acer has established its own name brand and risen to become the world's seventh largest computer manufacturer. 21 The HSIP model is quite unique in two respects, based on a survey of science parks around the world, especially among the LDCs. 22 First, it combines both manufacturing and R&D. In fact, HSIP was built to create a synergy between the two.
23 Second, this park in recent years has become a magnet for returning Chinese-American scientists and engineers, causing a mini reversal of brain drain. Since there is an accumulated pool of 19 One publication reversed the term "brain drain" altogether, and call it Taiwan's "brain gain," Business Week, Research, vol. 12, no. 4 (1988) Research, vol. 12, no. 2 (1988) Venturing; vol. 4 (1989), pp. 49-67. 23 In contrast, South Korea's Dae Dok Science Town contains clusters of public research institutions, but no manufacturing facilities. Development of science parks in Latin America is virtually non-existent. The maquiladora (in-bond) factories along the U.S.-Mexican border mainly serve as offshore assemblers for U.S. firms. They are more like Taiwan's old EPZs. Brazil's Manaus Free Trade Zone has ironically become an odd import haven in a sea of domestic market protection. However, India has two important places for high-technology products: ( 1) Santa Cruz Electronics Export Processing Zone (SEEPZ) in Bombay and, more recently, (2) the southern city of Bangalore, both evidently inspired by Silicon Valley, and both having significantly cultivated India's software manpower and information exports.
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such talents, Taiwan may be in a unique position with such human capital, which is a rare advantage for any LDC. In this regard, HSIP will continue to play a key role in transferring technology-via experienced scientists and engineers seeking to realize their entrepreneurial ambitions.
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI)
The Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) under the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) is the government body involved in the daily administration of industrial development. 24 Under the supervision of MOEA and CEPD are two important organizations charged with R&D: ITRI and III. The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), established in 1974, was charged with R&D on hardware: computers, ICs, peripherals, semiconductors, and communication equipment. In 1974, ERSO (Electronics Research and Service Organization) was created under ITRI, and has since been involved in every generation of semiconductor development in Taiwan-from the IC (integrated circuits) project in the 1970s, to the VLSI (very large-scale integrated circuits) project in the 1980s, and to the submicron project of the 1990s. In fact, the establishment of ERSO was directly related to Taiwan's first IC projectthrough a licensing agreement with the American firm, RCA. 25 In the early years, ITRI even played the role as an incubator and manufacturer. The United Microelectronics Corp. (UMC), one of Taiwan's largest and most successful IC houses, originated as a spinoff of ERS0.
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There was also a high interchange of personnel between ERSO and the industry, or, more accurately, the exodus of ERSO employees to the private industry, because of the higher pay offered by industry. Exchange of personnel and expertise among ERSO, academia, and the industry is also quite common -in fact it was facilitated by geographic proximity and institutional support. Furthermore, joint research is actively encouraged, especially in Hsinchu. This may be necessary given Taiwan's industrial structure, which is dominated by small-and medium-sized firms. fusion effect of the ITRI/ERSO/RCA model was dearly felt in Taiwan's high-tech community. Over the years ERSO has trained numerous competent IC design and fabrication personnel, enabling Taiwan to become one of the few countries in the world that possesses credible IC design and fabrication capabilities.
As has been said earlier, the Taiwanese state has often stepped in to pick up the slack where the private sector is either insufficient or unwilling to move in. However, to create positive externalities in learning and cooperation within the industry, the government has in recent years tried to involve the private sector in joint R&D coordinated by the state (e.g., the five-year submicron technology development plan).
But in recent years, ITRI has concentrated on developing plausible industrial technologies and then transferring them for commercial production to interested and qualified private companies, usually in HSIP. By drawing an ample supply of capable technical manpower from the two nearby leading technology universities, Tsing-hua and Chiao-tung, and by feeding research results to the firms in HSIP, ITRI played a very positive role as a bridge between research and production, or as a conveyor belt between technology and commodity. Its focus on industrial and applied technology, as opposed to purely basic research, and its focus on D rather than R avoided many common mistakes found in other NICs.
Institute for Information Industry (III)
The III, established in 1979 at Li's behest, was charged with R&D on software, market intelligence, and dissemination of information technology. Jointly supported by the government, academic institutions, and private organizations, III's main mission is software development, including providing advice and guidance to the government and private organizations. In recent years, III has become the most important body for the training of the much needed information industry manpower. Moreover, its Market Intelligence Center (MIC) has provided market intelligence to both the public and private sectors. 27 Further, the government in recent years has requested III to inspect so(tware and hardware for exports in compliance with intellectual property rights protection. 28 III's most important task in recent years is the Software Engineering Environment Development (SEED) project. SEED's goal, according to Huang Wei-teh, III's vice president, is "to computerize everything possible (in Taiwan) ." The SEED project, launched by III in 1988 with an investment of US$20 million, sought to provide an infrastructure for further development of the high value-added products and pollution-free software industry requiring very litde labor or space. This is important because, as Huang asserts, "Taiwan produces 10 percent of total world output of personal computers, yet computer application in this country is [still] very limited." Software products made up about 10 percent of Taiwan's total information industry which was expected to spearhead future technological growth in the country. 29 Naturally, other institutions such as OSTA, IDIC, DCI, and Tel Lab are also important. However, other noninstitutional features not shown on the chart are worth mentioning. The chiefs of ITRI, ERSO, and III (or Taiwan's industrialist-bureaucrat elites for that matter) had all been trained in top U.S. engineering schools, had worked for renowned U.S. companies and had reached prominent positions before they returned to Taiwan and began to experiment with their expertise. This is a more effective means of technology transfer'<' than the conventional one, which equates higher technology with novel "chic" products.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of the institutions promoting the information industry in Taiwan. First, the institutional arrangements of Taiwan's information industry reflect the widespread acceptance of the new economic ideology of enhancing national economy and quality of life through information technology. They also reflect key policy planners' view that the information industry holds a central place in Taiwan's new development strategy in light of the new challenges facing the nation.
Second, various institutional and legal infrastructures were created to facilitate the development of the information industry. Especially worth noting are the organic relationships among the government, public research labs, technology universities, and private businesses. The ITRI/III/HSIP model constitutes as much a bottom-up mode of industrial policy-making as the traditional and less effective top-down mode. The type of joint R&D is perhaps a harbinger of high-technology devel- 29 Free China journal, 2July 1990, p. 7. 30 Hsien..:hee Fang, vice-chairman, III, and special advisor, ITRI, personal interview, 27 July 1990, Taipei. Dr. Fang left the Telecommunications Directorate in 1975 to become ITRI's president. In 1979, he became III's first president.
opment. The instrumental role of the state in initiating novel projects need not be denied. However, in order for a project to sustain itself and prosper, the private sector must be involved and take over through "spillover" or "trickl~own" effects.
Third, not shown on the organizational chart is the enormous influence wielded by this particular high-technology epistemic community.
The impact of such key figures as K T. Li and Y. S. Sun (ex-premier and benefactor of the IC project) simply can not be underestimated. They did so much to chart Taiwan's high-technology expedition.
CONCLUSION: THE POUTICAL ECONOMY OF TAIWANESE SUCCESS IN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES
We can now revisit the most salient elements of Taiwanese success in high-tech development: the entrepreneurial state, guerrilla capitalists, and the accommodative technologists.
Entrepreneurial State
The first factor in the discussion of patterns of high-technology development is the role of the state. The role of the state in creating high-technology industries, AICs and LDCs alike, is indispensable. This is because high-technology industries, as Tyson argues, possess the following characteristics: imperfect competition, strategic behavior, dynamic economies of scale, and technological externalities, hence providing a fertile breeding ground for interventionist policies. "Nearly everyone now concedes that competitive advantage in high-technology industries is created [emphasis added], not endowed by nature, and that governments the world over have earmarked them for special support. "~1 Although I agree with Li's argument that "depoliticization" (i.e., liberalization of the economy) was a key reason for Taiwan's "growth with equity" model in the last four decades,~2 I would argue that the new development strategy (technology-intensive EU), which intends to overcome the bottlenecks encountered by continued labor-intensive EU, actually necessitates a reinvolvement of the state in creating new comparative advantages. Nevertheless, this new active state role is defined by new democratic politics.
Specifically, the state in Taiwan has performed three essential tasks with regard to high technology development. The first is to provide guidance and sequence timing of projects. The second is to provide legal (e.g., statutes and laws) and institutional infrastructures (e.g., III, ITRI, HSIP). The third is to directly become the producer in some cases of market failures. The state wears the complementary hats of administrator and entrepreneur.
The question of why the Taiwanese state was able to play an important and positive role in the development of high-technology industries poses interesting theoretical puzzles. Although the state has assumed an increasingly important role as an entrepreneur in the production and distribution of goods and services, particularly in developing countries, earlier scholarship was often quite skeptical or uncertain about the state's entrepreneurial functions.~~ However, more recently several interesting studies have found positive functions for the state from the Taiwanese case (e.g., with regard to export expansion and the position of wage labor).
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I would argue that in developing high-technology industries, state entrepreneurship in Taiwan was a necessary response to Taiwan's decentralized industrial structure, dominated by small-and medium-sized firms (to be elaborated upon later), limited technological resources and entrepreneurship, and the state's own developmental vision. It played a key role, and made some smart choices.
However, now it must work in a new political environment, which is subject to democratic scrutiny, and must acquire a new political style. The early "easy success" on hardware expansion has gradually given way to a more fundamental improvement of software, service, and application. This is because the elevation of national well-being requires "informationalization" of the society, to which this new approach is critical. 33 Raymond D. Duvall and John R Freeman, "'The Techno-Bureaucratic Elite and the Entrepreneurial State in Dependent Development," American Political Science Review, vol. 77 ( 1983) , pp. 569-87; "'The State and Dependent Capitalism," International Studies QJ.<arterly, vol. 25 (1981), pp. 99-118. 34 Steve Chan, Cal Clark, and David R Davis, "State Entrepreneurship, Foreign Investment, Export Expansion, and Economic Growth," jrmrnal of Conflict &solution, vol. 34, no. 1 (1990) Studies, vol. 23, no. 3 (1990), pp. 314-33. In sum, the state in Taiwan is developmentally oriented, 35 committed to furthering economic growth and technological advancement. In the case of a high-tech industry such as IT, the state has done more than just correct market failures; it has also strived to created new sources of competitive advantage.
Guerrilla Capitalists
The second factor in the discussion of patterns of high-tech developmentis industrial structure. In this regard, Taiwan's decentralized (smalland medium-sized firms) structure has often been contrasted with Korea's centralized (chaebol) model. Table 3 compares South Korea's "bigness" and Taiwan's "smallness" models. ~ach model entails distinct strengths and weaknesses and each seems suitable for peculiar niches in the global high technology industries. Naturally, the contrasts between In contrast, the South Korean model of high-technology development can be characterized as an oligopolistic model. Vertically integrated and horizontally diversified into a wide array of industrial and financial sectors, these chaebol can achieve economy of scale and cross-subsidization. They can even take a long-term business perspective by employing predatory practices (e.g., dumping) to secure market shares. Their organization efficiency is fully realized in the manufacturing of commodity products suited for mass fabrication (e.g., memory chips). However, due to their growing size and bureaucratization, South Korean chaebol are often slower than their Taiwanese competitors in responding to changing market signals. 59 Also, the chaebol have made several costly mistakes in the past, because each was trying to outspend the others and together they sought to challenge the American and Japanese industry leaders head on.
Compared with the Korea, Inc. or the conglomerate model, Taiwan's information industry has pursued a "niche" strategy. This "mushroom" model is suitable for Taiwan, thanks to its small firms. It is more "democratic" in that it popularizes the information movement and proliferates high-caliber manpower. The niche strategy allows commercial agility and selective specialization. It will probably fare better against the neoprotectionist mood in the AICs (e.g., in the form of antidumping). These capitalists nimbly pursue business opportunities everywhere, and in their mind, no order is too small. They are guerrilla capitalists in the global commercial battle. Small can be beautiful; and selective can be competitive. This leads to the final point.
Accommodative Technologists
The third factor in the discussion of patterns of high-technology development is the choice of technology policy. The information industry is a very dynamic and fast moving industry, in which yesterday's winners and winning strategies can easily become tomorrow's losers. The crisis, failures, and restructuring of America's major computer companies (e.g., IBM, Digital, Wang, among others) give some indication of the challenges facing even the most successful Taiwanese companies. The debates over proprietary vs. "open" technologies, super vs. micro systems, centralized vs. decentralized models, and basic vs. commercial R&D all pose fundamental questions as to the appropriate choice of strategies in high-technology development. 
Generally speaking, Taiwanese companies are not inventors, which define the "paradigms" of technological progress. Rather, most of them are learners, and a few of them are innovators. So the challenge for a successful NIC like Taiwan is how to transform itself from a copycat to a true inventor. On this point, we find an interesting divergence on lww to accomplish this goal: Taiwan has adopted an "accommodative" strategy, whereas countries such as Brazil and India have adopted an "assertive" strategy. Table 4 summarizes these two models. 40 As can be seen from this table, countries adopting accommodative high-tech strategy usually strive to incorporate high-tech industries in their overall macroeconomic adjustment. This is certainly true in the Taiwanese case. Furthermore, access to world markets and foreign technology also ensures the viability of the industry. By contrast, countries adopting the assertive strategy have sought to "break the shackles of the product cycle" by creating a "national" high-tech base, without regard to cost-benefit effectiveness.
The Taiwanese case shows that purely "national" technology, developed independent of world technological trends, is both undesirable and impossible. The very dynamic nature of IT industry calls for constant adaptation and learning. Taiwan's information industry in the early period emphasized and capitalized from hardware, thanks to the opportunities created by PC and microelectronics, and the ability to seize these opportunities. Over the years, through introduction, learning, and adaptation of foreign technologies, the industry has gradually moved up the technological ladder. It was not done by closing the borders. Rather, it was done through a dynamic division of labor between the state, MNCs, and local firms. In the years to come, this industry's emphasis will shift to software and application as part of a grass-root movement toward an information society. A change in attitudes toward information and the ability to use it may be a prerequisite for the upgrading of the society and economy. Acquisition of technology was done in an accom71Wdative manner with a view to harnessing it with the nation's overall economic development. It was not done by asserting narrow economic nationalism and shutting off external trends. · In sum, the drama of Taiwan's information industry is played out by the dynamic trio of the entrepreneurial state, guerrilla capitalists, and accommodative technologists. The success of a NIC like Taiwan in developing high-tech offers optimism for the Third World: a nation's place in the international system is not ascribed, but acquired.
University of Miami, September 1995
4() See Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "Models of High Technology Development in the East Asian and Latin American NICs, " Pacific Focus, vol. 9, no. 2 (1994) , pp. 5-42.
